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Abstract
This paper estimates the GDP impact of legislated tax changes in Spain using a newly 
constructed narrative record for the period 1986-2015. Our baseline estimates suggest 
that a 1% of GDP increase in exogenous taxes depresses output by around 1.3% after one 
year, this negative effect fading away at more distant horizons. We also fi nd that the effect 
of changes in indirect taxes are larger and that, following a tax increase, investment reacts 
more than consumption. Overall, our set of estimates is consistent with negative output 
effects triggered by tax increases, yet the quantitative effects are subject to non-negligible 
uncertainty that is refected in wide confi dence bands, in line with the extant literature for 
other countries.
Keywords: tax shocks, narrative record, fi scal policy, GDP growth.
JEL classifi cation: E32, E62, H20.
Resumen
En este artículo estimamos el efecto sobre el PIB de los cambios impositivos a partir de una 
base datos narrativa que hemos construido para el periodo 1986-2015. La estimación base 
muestra que un aumento de los impuestos equivalente al 1 % del PIB reduce el producto un 
1,3 % después de un año; tendiendo este efecto a desaparecer en horizontes más amplios. 
Los resultados también muestran que el efecto de la imposición indirecta es mayor y que, 
después de un aumento impositivo, la inversión reacciona más que el consumo. En su conjunto, 
nuestra estimaciones sugieren que los aumentos impositivos tienen consecuencias negativas 
sobre el PIB. No obstante, el grado de caída del producto está sujeto a incertidumbre, ya que 
las bandas de confi anza son amplias. Este resultado está en línea con la literatura narrativa 
para otros países. 
Palabras clave: cambios impositivos, base de datos narrativa, política fi scal, crecimiento 
del PIB.
Códigos JEL: E32, E62, H20.
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1 Introduction
The macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy has long been a matter of great importance for re-
searchers and policymakers, and the financial crisis in general and the public debt crisis in some
euro area countries in particular have nothing but increased the interest in this topic. However,
despite this growing interest, there is still no consensus about the economic consequences of fis-
cal actions. For example, in Alesina and Giavazzi (2013) the editors argue that “researchers are
still deeply divided on some crucial issues such as the size (and sometimes also the sign) of fiscal
multipliers.”
Part of this discrepancy stems from the fact that measuring the impact of fiscal shocks is
inherently difficult. Very often fiscal changes respond to or are correlated with macroeconomic
conditions, hence causal effects are hard to establish. The recent literature has addressed this
identification problem in mainly two ways. First, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) estimate a struc-
tural vector autoregression (SVAR) by modeling the relationship between the reduced-form resid-
uals and the structural shocks using external information on the output elasticity of government
purchases and of taxes, and by assuming that policymakers do not react contemporaneously to
output shocks. Second, the narrative record identifies directly the fiscal policy shocks that are
uncorrelated with macroeconomic conditions, by identifying the motivation behind each legislated
tax change.1
In this paper we adopt the narrative approach to estimate the output effects of tax shocks in
Spain. To this end, we have constructed a detailed record of all the relevant legislated tax changes
implemented during the period 1986-2015. Therefore, this paper contributes to the literature
pioneered by Romer and Romer (2010), who were the first to estimate the GDP effects of tax
shocks using a narrative record, in their case for the US. Later on, this approach has been applied
to the UK (Cloyne (2013)), Germany (Hayo and Uhl (2013) and Gechert et al. (2016)) and Portugal
(Pereira and Wemans (2015)).2
Our work follows closely the methodology developed by this literature. First, we identify the
tax measures that were more likely to be influenced by other macroeconomic shocks, in order to
exclude them from the estimated impulse-response functions. To do so, we look at the motivation
of each tax change, and categorize it as either “endogenous” (motivated by current or prospective
macroeconomic conditions) or “exogenous” (whose motivation is not to offset macro developments),
according to the eightfold classification proposed by Cloyne (2013). As some actions are difficult
to categorize, for example those adopted during the recent period of financial turmoil, we discuss
in detail the rationale behind our grouping.
1This approach has been used to estimate the impact of monetary policy (Romer and Romer (1989) and Romer
and Romer (2004)), government spending (Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and Ramey (2011)) and fiscal consolidations
(Guajardo et al. (2011)).
2The relative scarce number of countries subject to the narrative approach reflects the considerable effort
required by the construction of a record of legislated tax changes.
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We then aggregate the exogenous tax changes on a quarterly series. In order to assess the
independence of this series from economic conditions, we check whether it can be predicted on
the basis of past macroeconomic shocks. We show that we can reject predictability in most of
the tests. However, the announcement of some measures during the financial crisis appear to be
correlated with past macro developments. For this reason, the baseline estimates are based on a
series that excludes those tax changes adopted in the period 2008-2013. We also show that the
full set of exogenous taxes (including those implemented during the financial crisis) deliver similar
impulse-response functions.
Next, we estimate the GDP effects of an exogenous tax change by constructing impulse-response
functions derived from simple VARs. The benchmark specification is a three-variable VAR of per
capita GDP, per capita government spending, and the short-term interest rate, with the tax series
included as an exogenous regressor. We find that a 1% of GDP increase in taxes depresses output
by around 1.3% after one year, this effect fading away at more distant horizons. We also find,
as already mentioned, that including the measures adopted during the financial crisis does not
significantly affect the estimates. Moreover, we show that this is also the case if we focus on
tax changes aiming at increasing long-run growth or imposed by foreign institutions, which are
less likely to respond to business cycle developments. Also, we find larger fiscal multipliers if we
consider changes in indirect taxes and if we focus on the effect of tax shocks on investment, rather
than on output or consumption. In all our results we show that the point estimates are subject to
non-negligible uncertainty, as confidence bands are wide. Therefore, we raise a flag of caution in
over interpreting some quantitative results.
All things considered, our set of estimates provides a coherent picture of negative short-term
output effects triggered by tax increases (and vice versa). Overall, our results appear smaller
when compared to previous findings of the narrative literature, and they contrast sharply with
the results found for Spain thus far. In this regard, the related literature typically finds that the
short-term GDP response to a net tax shock tends to be positive, a fact that is rationalized in
those studies by highlighting that, following the revenue shock, a parallel increase of government
expenditure takes place, pushing up GDP, see de Castro (2006), de Castro and Herna´ndez de
Cos (2008), and de Castro et al. (2014). In addition, this result probably reflects the difficulties
of properly identifying a net tax shock within the SVAR approach and limited sample sizes, as
reflected in a number of studies with European data, see European Commission (2012). This
underlines the value of the narrative record, which is precisely aimed at determining which fiscal
shocks are unrelated to macro conditions, and therefore it is able to provide an unbiased estimate
of the output effects of tax changes, see the in-depth discussions of Romer and Romer (2010) and
Cloyne (2013).
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and discusses the endogenous/exogenous categorization of tax measures. Section 3 shows the main
results regarding the GDP effects of tax shocks, and Section 4 presents further results. Section 5
concludes. Supplementary material can be found in the Appendix.
2 Narrative Record of Legislated Tax Changes in Spain
(1986 - 2015)
This section describes the compilation of the legislated tax changes in Spain, the identification
of the exogenous tax shocks, and the tests performed to assess their predictability given business
cycle developments.
2.1 Construction of the Dataset
We compiled all the legislated tax measures adopted in Spain during the period 1986-2015. In doing
so, we used multiple sources, covering a wide range of reports from different government agencies.
We highlight three important ones. First, the Budget Law, which is typically approved in the last
quarter of each year. This law is regarded as the most relevant bill passed by Parliament, and it
usually contains the most significant fiscal actions to be implemented in the following year. Second,
the annual and monthly bulletins of the Tax Agency, which contain a very detailed account of tax
revenues. Moreover, they describe all the recently adopted tax changes, and provide an estimate
of their quantitative impact, both on an annual basis and on a monthly basis in the last years of
our sample. And third, own reports elaborated in real-time by Banco de Espan˜a, containing both
a description and a quantitative assessment of the revenue effects of tax measures. These latter
reports are elaborated in the context of the fiscal surveillance framework of the Eurosystem.
In order to compute the revenue impact of each measure, as it is standard in this literature, we
quantify the yearly change in revenues prompted by the tax change at the quarter it is implemented,
normalized by GDP. Implementation corresponds to the first quarter in which the tax action
triggers a change in tax liabilities/payments with respect to the previous year. For corporate
income taxes we take into account the timing of tax payments as dictated by the extant legislation.
In April a first payment must be done, of approximately 25% of tax liabilities (which are a function
of the previous year’s profits). A second installment is due in October (50%), and a third one in
December (25%). Therefore, if a corporate tax action comes into effect in January, the yearly
impact is assigned to the second quarter, as the first payment is done in April. If it comes into
force after April, the yearly impact is assigned to the last quarter. For the personal income tax, as
this is withheld at source, the yearly impact is assigned to the first quarter in which tax liabilities
change. This is also the case of indirect taxes. Moreover, if the implementation of a tax measure
lasts more than one year, we identify the set of revenue effects at each quarter it is implemented.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes our narrative record
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We also consider the temporary/permanent nature of each tax action: for measures announced
to be temporary, we compute the revenue effect and compensate it with an effect of the opposite
sign when the tax change is reversed. We also regard as tax shocks the failure to update excise
(per unit) duties in a context of high inflation, which leads to a fall in revenue.3 One advantage
of our dataset is that we are able to use mainly estimated revenue changes, rather than revenue
forecasts. These estimates are given by official sources, especially the Tax Agency, the Ministry of
Finance and Banco de Espan˜a.
We include in our dataset tax measures having a yearly revenue impact of more than 0.05%
of GDP in absolute value in at least one quarter. Under this criterion, we record 75 legislated
tax changes, of which 33 are permanent tax increases, 25 are permanent tax decreases, and 17 are
temporary measures, see panel A of Table I. The cumulative yearly impact of the permanent tax
increases is on average 0.22% of GDP, whereas that of permanent tax decreases is 0.25% of GDP.
See Appendix BList of Legislated Tax Changesappendix.B for a list of all the measures recorded.
Table I
Descriptive Statistics of the Recorded Tax Changes
Cumulative Yearly Impact
Number Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PANEL A: ALL TAX CHANGES
All (Permanent + Temporary) 75 0.01 0.28 -0.79 0.94
Permanent Tax Increases 33 0.22 0.22 0.05 0.94
Permanent Tax Decreases 25 -0.25 0.22 -0.79 -0.01
PANEL B: EXOGENOUS TAX CHANGES (ALSO EXCL. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS)
All (Permanent + Temporary) 45 -0.02 0.26 -0.79 0.75
Permanent Tax Increases 19 0.19 0.17 0.05 0.75
Permanent Tax Decreases 19 -0.24 0.21 -0.79 -0.05
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics of all recorded tax changes (panel A) and the
exogenous series excluding the financial crisis (panel B), which is used to compute the baseline
impulse-response functions. The categorization of tax changes is explained in Sections 2.3 and
2.4. Columns (2) to (5) show statistics on the cumulative yearly impact of the tax measures.
Note that, by definition, the cumulative yearly impact of temporary measures is zero, see
Section 2.1.
2.2 Overview of Legislated Tax Changes in Spain
In this section, we provide a brief overview of the tax changes recorded in our narrative dataset for
the period 1986-2015. Figure I plots the quarterly time series. A much more detailed account with
emphasis on the motivation and the macroeconomic conditions surrounding the main tax changes
can be found in Appendix AOverview of Legislated Tax Changes in Spainappendix.A.
The first ten years of our dataset (1986-1995) include mainly tax reforms aiming at adapting the
Spanish tax code to the European regulations and complying with with European Treaties. The
3This means the inclusion of two shocks at the start of our sample.
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Figure I
Legislated Tax Changes as Percentage of GDP
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Notes: This figure shows the legislated tax changes in the period 1986q1-2015q4
as a percentage of GDP. Shaded areas correspond to two negative quarters of
GDP growth.
government created the value added tax in 1986, fulfilling a requirement of the Spanish accession
to the European Economic Community. Later on, it raised it twice (in 1992) in order to comply
with the convergence criteria set in the Maastricht Treaty. A main reform of the personal income
tax was approved in June 1991 and implemented in 1992-1993, motivated by a a sentence of the
Constitutional Court deeming unconstitutional some articles of the original law of 1979 and 1985.
This reform had a negative impact on revenue, due to the introduction of an exempt minimum
income. Increases in indirect taxes (on fuel) had a significant impact on revenue in 1990 and 1991.
Following a reform of the corporate income tax in 1996, with a positive impact on revenue,
the period 1997-2007 was characterized by tax decreases, stemming chiefly from revisions of the
personal income tax (in 1999, 2003 and 2007), and the corporate income tax (in 2007), coupled
with changes in social contributions and indirect taxes. Although small counter cyclical measures
were adopted in 2002, in order to tackle a deceleration of activity, these reforms targeted long-run
growth, competitiveness and compliance with European standards.
In 2008, after significant signs of a slowdown in activity, the government adopted a big stimulus
package of around 1% of GDP. The tax decreases spanned 2008 and early 2009. After that,
increasing concerns about the budget balance made the government change the policy stance. Tax
increases were adopted in subsequent austerity packages, in December 2009, May 2010, August
2011, December 2011 and July 2012. They comprised significant increases in the personal income
tax, the corporate income tax, the value added tax, as well as the suppression of a large number
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of deductions. This contractionary fiscal policy ended by around 2013-2014, where some of the
measures adopted previously still had an effect. Following a vigorous economic recovery and ahead
of an electoral year, the government decreased direct taxes in 2015 by an amount close to 1% of
GDP.
2.3 Construction of the Exogenous Tax Series
In order to estimate the impact of legislated tax changes on GDP, it is necessary to purge the tax
series from tax changes that respond to current or prospective macroeconomic conditions. Failure
to do so involves the risk of assigning to tax changes the effect of other shocks affecting output,
therefore incurring in an omitted variable bias. The narrative literature distinguishes between
“endogenous” and “exogenous” tax measures. This distinction, rather than strictly econometric,
is one of terminology. The former correspond to tax measures enacted in order to offset other
macroeconomic shocks likely to affect output in the near term. Therefore, they are invalid to
estimate the impact of tax shocks on output. Examples of such measures are a tax decrease
because policy makers forecast a recession, and a tax increase approved in order to finance a
rise in spending. Tax measures deemed exogenous are those whose motivation is not to offset
current macroeconomic developments. Examples of such measures include tax cuts implemented
to increase potential output, and tax changes imposed by external bodies, such as the European
institutions. These exogenous measures, to the extent that they are orthogonal to current or
prospective macroeconomic conditions, are valid to estimate the effect of tax changes on GDP.
Cloyne (2013) provides a useful eightfold terminology on what can be considered endogenous
and exogenous tax changes. We follow his guidance to construct the exogenous tax series of our
narrative dataset. Our assessment of the the motivation of each tax measure is based on the
examination of the introductory comments of each bill, press releases, media news and different
reports.
Endogenous tax changes can be classified in four categories. First, a “demand management”
change, that attempts to adjust aggregate demand to offset macroeconomic fluctuations. That is,
tax measures pursuing a counter cyclical goal. We include in this category two measures adopted
in 2002 to counteract a slowdown in activity, the stimulus package of April 2008 and one measure
adopted in 2011 to improve the activity of the construction sector. We also include in this category
a corporate income tax cut approved in late 2006 but with a large impact in the second quarter
of 2008, when several stimulus actions were implemented.
Second, a “supply-side” reform, that attempts to offset a shock through the supply side of
the economy. One example of this category is a reduction of social contributions in March 2009,
aiming at fostering the labor market.
Third, a “deficit reduction” action, that is, a legislated tax change stemming from concerns
over current movements in the deficit. This category is the most difficult to delimit. Romer and
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Romer (2010) argue that tax measures responding to inherited budget deficits must be regarded
as exogenous, as they are the consequence of past rather than current or future shocks. Cloyne
(2013) distinguishes between “deficit reduction” measures, deemed endogenous, and “deficit con-
solidation” measures, deemed exogenous. As stated, the former includes measures triggered by
concerns over current movements of the deficit or by a clear consequence of another shock. The
latter includes measures adopted in order to deal with a budget deficit independently of the current
macroeconomic conditions. Most of the measures taken by Spain in the period 2010-2012 clearly
aimed at dealing with a growing budget deficit. Given the institutional setting of the Stability
and Growth Pact, it can be argued that, at least partly, tax raises were imposed exogenously to
the country, i.e. European policy makers paid less attention to GDP growth when suggesting the
reforms, focusing instead on the evolution of the public deficit. On the other hand, some of the
measures were taken under episodes of fiscal stress, which could have an independent effect on
GDP growth. This reasoning suggests us to exclude from the exogenous tax series those measures
adopted under periods of high financial turmoil, whereas reforms adopted to tackle the budget
deficit under milder financial conditions and specially those with large implementation lags are
in principle valid to be included in the exogenous tax series. As we note in the next section,
however, we found that excluding all measures adopted during the financial crisis improves the
unpredictability of the tax series, which advises us to shed all tax changes of the period 2008-
2013, yet at the cost of losing the valuable information provided by the financial crisis. Given this
trade-off, our empirical strategy is to estimate the baseline impulse-response functions with a tax
series that excludes the endogenous measures and the (exogenous) tax changes adopted during
the financial crisis, whereas we use the exogenous series with the tax changes adopted during the
crisis in order to asses the sensitivity of the results (see Section 4.1).
Regarding the categorization of the measures adopted during the crisis, we deemed as endoge-
nous the austerity packages of August 2011 and July 2012. These were packages adopted with
urgency under financial turmoil. Indeed, both of them were passed when the risk premium was
at historical heights, see Figure II. We also deemed as endogenous the fiscal package of December
2009, because it consisted mainly on the removal of a stimulus measure adopted before. On the
contrary, we classified as exogenous the austerity packages of May 2010, December 2011 and March
2012. The package of May 2010 was adopted under financial turmoil, but it consisted mainly on
expenditure measures. The only relevant tax measure within that package was the suppression of
a deduction on births and adoptions, which was announced in May but implemented in January
the next year. Following the criterion of measuring impact at implementation rather than at an-
nouncement, we keep it in the exogenous series.4 The packages of December 2011 and March 2012
fall in the category of tax changes stemming from inherited deficits. The former was adopted by a
4Under the same criterion, we classify as exogenous an increase in the value added tax passed in the package of
December 2009 but implemented in July the following year.
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new cabinet a few days after taking office, with the single goal of consolidating the public finances
given an expected deviation of the budget from the target set by the European Union. The latter
was approved a few weeks later when that deviation materialized. Moreover, both packages were
implemented in relatively milder financial conditions: the risk premium was 150 basic points lower
than the historical height reached in November 2011. Note that, as we stated before, the base-
line estimates excludes all the measures adopted during the crisis, whereas the exogenous changes
implemented during this period are used only in Section 4.1.
Figure II
Austerity Packages and the Risk Premium (2009-2012)
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Notes: This figure shows the fiscal austerity packages approved in the period
2009-2012 and the daily Spanish risk premium, defined as the excess return of
the Spanish 10-year bond with respect to its German counterpart. Fiscal pack-
ages framed by boxes are deemed as endogenous. The packages of August 2011
and July 2012 were taken under episodes of fiscal stress (risk premium at his-
torical heights), and therefore their effects on GDP could be confounded by the
effect of the concomitant financial turmoil. The package of December 2009 is
also excluded because it consisted mainly on the removal of an endogenous mea-
sure. The packages of May 2010, December 2011 and March 2012 are deemed
exogenous, and therefore included in the baseline regressions. Measures adopted
in May 2010 consisted only on expenditure actions, the only tax action being
implemented in January 2011. The packages of December 2011 and March 2012
fall in the category of tax changes stemming from inherited deficits. The for-
mer was adopted by a recently elected government with the aim of consolidating
the public finances given an expected deviation of the budget from the target
set by the EU. The latter was approved a few weeks later when that deviation
materialized.
The fourth category of exogenous tax measures are “spending-driven” changes, aimed at fi-
nancing an spending action. One prominent example of this is the introduction of a duty on fuels
in 2002 in order to finance health expenditure.
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Exogenous tax changes are likewise classified in four categories. First, “long-run” economic
reforms, aiming at increasing long-run growth, rather than offsetting a shock. One example of
this is the 2003 personal income tax reform, which was motivated on these grounds. Second,
“ideological” changes, stemming from philosophical reasons, such as a preference for a lower fiscal
pressure. Third, “external” changes, imposed by foreign bodies, such as the European Union.
Many fiscal measures in our database correspond to this category. To name a few, the introduction
of the value added tax in 1986, adopted as a requirement of the accession to the European Economic
Community; two increases of this tax in 1992, passed in the context of the Maastricth Treaty; and
the reform of direct taxation implemented in mid and late 1990s, in order to adapt the tax system
to European standards and help the country adopt the euro. And fourth, “deficit consolidation”
measures, adopted in order to anchor credibility, independently of the current macroeconomic
conditions. As already discussed, we include in this category two fiscal packages adopted in late
2011 and early 2012, which main motivation was to comply with European rules. Other fiscal
packages adopted in the period 2009-2012 were also to some extent imposed by the European
institutions. However, they were taken under episodes of financial turmoil, which advices us to
exclude them in the estimation of the effect of tax changes on GDP, as already discussed.
Overall, of the 75 measures adopted in the period 1986-2015, we classify 18 as endogenous.
Furthermore, of the remaining exogenous changes, 12 were adopted during the financial crisis
(2008-2013). This leaves us with 44 tax shocks, which comprise the narrative series that we use in
the main simulations. In panel B of Table I we show descriptive statistics of this series and Figure
III displays the timeline.5
2.4 Predictability of the Exogenous Tax Series
To assess how well our original narrative dataset has been purged from measures adopted with
counter cyclical motivations, we analyze the predictability of our “exogenous” tax shocks following
movements of output, government spending, inflation, and the short-term interest rate. These
are standard tests proposed by the narrative literature, although it must be stressed that the
contemporaneous independence of each tax change with respect to other aggregate fluctuations
affecting GDP cannot be tested.
We perform four tests. First, a simple F-test of the joint significance of the macro covariates in
a linear regression with our tax series as the dependent variable. Second, a VAR Granger causality
test. Third, an ordered probit regression at the announcement date. This involves defining a
dependent variable taking value −1 on the quarter a tax cut is announced, 0 if there are no tax
announcements, and 1 if a tax increase is revealed, where the sign of the tax change is assessed
according to its cumulative impact. Then, the predictability of tax announcements is assessed by
means of a likelihood ratio test on models with and without the macro covariates. And fourth, we
5The distribution of the tax measures is the following. Long-run: 19; external: 9; and deficit consolidation: 17.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 16 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1721
Figure III
Exogenous Legislated Tax Changes as Percentage of GDP
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Notes: This figure shows the tax series used to estimate the baseline impulse-
response functions. It corresponds to the exogenous (not triggered by current
or prospective macroeconomic conditions) legislated tax changes excluding also
those changes adopted during the financial crisis (2008-2013). Shaded areas cor-
respond to two negative quarters of GDP growth.
perform a similar likelihood ratio test but defining the dependent variable at the implementation
date, rather than at the announcement date. In all tests we use four lags of the macro covariates
as well as of the dependent variable.
Table II shows the results. The exogenous tax series passes three of the four tests, see column
(2). To be more more precise, we find no evidence of Granger-causality between the macro variables
and the legislated tax changes. Moreover, in the simplest linear specification (F-test) we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that the macro variables are jointly non-significant in their association
with the tax shocks, see the first two rows. Our exogenous tax series though fails to pass the
ordered probit test at announcement date, see the third row. That is, we find some evidence
that macro developments help forecast decisions on tax changes, although not the magnitude.
This casts doubts on the degree of independence of the narrative series from economic conditions,
yet the small sample bias can also play a role. Importantly, however, we find that these macro
conditions do not have predictive power when tax measures are evaluated at the implementation
date, see the fourth row. This is somewhat reassuring, as the impact of tax shocks is computed
when they enter into effect, rather than when they are announced. Moreover, it must be stressed
that the announcement date reflects mostly the date when the tax bill becomes law, which can
be a poor proxy of the timing when news about tax changes reach the economy. Yet, in order to
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shed light on these results, we analyze whether the predictability is influenced by the tax changes
adopted during the turbulent times associated to the financial crisis. We do so by excluding the
tax changes adopted during the period 2008-2013 and we find that this series comfortably passes
the four tests. As explained before, given these results and bearing in mind that the tax series
enters as an exogenous variable in the VARs, we stick to the series without the financial crisis
for estimating the baseline impulse-response functions and assess the sensitivity of the results to
including those exogenous measures adopted in the period of high financial turmoil. As it turns
out, both series deliver similar impulse-response functions.6
Table II
Predictability Tests of Legislated Tax Measures
All Tax Measures Exogenous Series Exogenous Series
(Endogenous & Exogenous) (1986-2015) (Excluding Financial Crisis)
(1) (2) (3)
F-test 0.4513 0.5492 0.6313
Granger Causality 0.1990 0.8080 0.8570
Ordered Probit Announcement Date 0.0466 0.0131 0.1720
Ordered Probit Implementation Date 0.3254 0.7791 0.9010
Notes: This table shows the p-value of tests assessing how predictable are the magnitude and timing of the legislated tax
measures. Column (1) includes all legislated tax measures (both endogenous and exogenous). The second column includes
only the exogenous tax shocks for the period 1986-2015. The third column excludes all tax changes adopted during the
financial crisis (2008-2013). The first row shows a linear F-test of the joint significance of the macro variables on their
association with the legislated tax shocks. The second row performs a Granger-causality test. The third and fourth rows
show likelihood ratio tests of the macro variables having no predictive power on the timing of legislated tax changes, at
announcement and implementation dates, respectively. Macro variables include log change of GDP, government spending,
inflation, and the short-term interest rate. All regressions include four lags of the macro variables as well as the tax series.
3 The Output Effects of Tax Changes in Spain
3.1 Baseline Specification
In this section we estimate the effect of a tax shock on GDP. We do so by estimating impulse-
response functions derived from VAR models, see Favero and Giavazzi (2012).7 Our baseline
specification is a VAR of three endogenous variables: log real per capita GDP, log real per capita
government spending and the short-term interest rate. Controlling for government spending and
financial conditions is important as they can play a significant role. For example, interest rates
experienced a large degree of volatility during the last years of our sample, affecting the dynamics
of output. Regarding public expenditure, some important changes were adopted at the time of
6Herna´ndez de Cos and Moral-Benito (2016) test the predictability of spending- and tax-based consolidations
using the annual narrative dataset constructed by Devries et al. (2011). The sample covers 17 OECD countries
during 1978-2007, including Spain. They find that spending-based consolidations can be predicted from past
realizations of macro variables, whereas tax-based consolidations are unpredictable.
7This is also the framework of Mertens and Ravn (2012), Cloyne (2013) and Hayo and Uhl (2013), among
others.
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legislated tax changes and some other, possibly, as a substitute. Therefore, these factors are likely
to affect the estimated impact of tax shocks on GDP. We add as exogenous variables the narrative
tax shocks and a linear trend. In this and the subsequent VARs, we include 3 lags of the tax shock
as well as of the endogenous variables, following an optimal lag length analysis.8 Regarding the
sources of the macro aggregate data, they are obtained from de Castro et al. (forthcoming).
The baseline VAR takes the following form:
Yt = A0 + A1t+ A2(L)Yt−1 + A3(L)τt + t (1)
where Y includes real GDP, real government spending and the 3-month interest rate; t is a
linear trend; τt is the narrative tax series; and A2(L) and A3(L) are lag polynomials of 3 lags.
In our impulse-response functions we estimate the output effect up to 12 quarters of a 1% of
GDP increase in tax liabilities. We compute 68 and 90% error bands by bootstrapping with 1,000
replications.
The panel A of Figure IV shows the baseline results. We find that after an increase in tax
liabilities of 1% of GDP, per capita output falls by 1.3% after one year, from that moment on
starting to improve until reaching an almost zero effect at the end of the projection horizon. The
impulse-response function is estimated with a fairly high degree of imprecision, as can be noted
from the wide confidence bands, which nevertheless suggest a significant decrease of GDP, at least
in the short term. In order to compare these results with the literature, we estimate our baseline
VAR for the US and the UK with the narrative series constructed by Romer and Romer (2010)
and Cloyne (2013), respectively.9 Panel B of Figure IV shows that the initial fall following a tax
increase is very similar to the one in the US and the UK. Nevertheless, the overall multiplier is
lower, as GDP in these two countries reaches the bottom at lower levels: -2.1% after 7 quarters in
the US and -2.6% after 10 quarters in the UK. Moreover, the UK estimates seem to fall outside
the 90% confidence bands estimated from Spain. Regarding other countries, Hayo and Uhl (2013)
report a GDP fall of 2.4% in Germany after around 8 quarters. Their specification encompasses a
five-variable VAR of output, tax revenues, government expenditures, the short-term interest rate
and the inflation rate. The estimates of Pereira and Wemans (2015) for Portugal render a drop of
2.3% after 3 years when controlling for output and government spending dynamics. Therefore, the
effect of taxes in Spain appears somewhat smaller than is generally found in the narrative literature.
This result is suggestive, although it must be taken with caution, given that these impulse-response
8The final prediction error, Akaike’s information criterion, and Hannan and Quinn information criterion suggest
a lag order of 3, whereas the Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion a lag order of 2.
9To keep consistency with these studies and given the larger sample size, the VAR models are estimated with
12 lags. The US VAR comprises the sample period 1950q1:2007q4. Government spending is defined as Federal
Government total expenditures minus interest payments and the interest rate is the Federal Funds rate. The UK
VAR is estimated for the period 1955q1:2009q4. Government spending is defined as government consumption and
the interest rate is the policy rate.
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functions are estimated with considerable uncertainty and that the model specification as well as
the sample periods differ, which can largely affect the comparison.
Figure IV
Impact of an Exogenous Tax Increase on GDP
Benchmark VAR
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Notes: This figure shows the impulse-response functions of an increase of 1% of GDP in taxes on output. The model is a three-variable
VAR of GDP, government spending, and the short-term interest rate, with the tax series added as an exogenous variable. 68 and 90%
error bands are depicted in gray areas. The panel B compares the point estimates of panel A with those obtained using the narrative
tax series and the macro variables of the US and the UK.
3.2 Effects of Two Types of Tax Changes
We now ask whether the different types of exogenous tax changes cataloged in Section 2.3 have dif-
ferent effects on output. We classified tax changes according to three categories: long-run reforms,
changes imposed by external bodies and deficit consolidation measures (we did not categorize any
tax change as “ideological change”). It must be noted though that the boundaries of such cat-
egories are sometimes blurred. For example, some of the convergence criteria established in the
different European treaties leading to the single currency involved significant tax changes. Some
of those measures were partly the consequence of actions by foreign institutions and partly were
driven by deficit consolidation concerns (e.g. the Maastricth Treaty). Also, some bills enacted
in order to bring closer the Spanish tax system to European standards were adopted not only to
fulfill an external requirement, but also with the aim of increasing long-run GDP. Given these
concerns, we classified each tax change according to what we think was the main motivation of
the bill, acknowledging that some judgments were inevitable.
With these caveats in mind, it is worth exploring whether differently types of tax changes imply
different output responses. For example, Romer and Romer (2010) find negative output effects
stemming from tax changes aiming at increasing long-run growth, and zero effects of deficit-driven
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tax rises. In this vein we compare two categories: external and long-run reforms, and deficit
consolidation measures. We combine the two first categories because quite often they respond
to the same underlying motivation. Moreover, they are more likely to be independent from the
business cycle, hence this exercise allows us to test the robustness of the results to excluding
measures more suspicious of suffering from endogeneity (see the discussion in Section 2.3). This
is of course at the cost of reducing the number of shocks and therefore leading to more imprecise
estimates. To implement this exercise, we add to the baseline VAR both types of tax changes as
exogenous regressors.
Figure V shows the timeline of both categories of tax changes. There are 28 measures motivated
by external bodies and long-run growth, and 17 measures motivated by the public deficit. The
former are spread over the sample period, whereas the latter are concentrated in the early 1990s
(note that the austerity packages adopted in 2010-2012, which were motivated by the developments
of the budget balance, were excluded from the baseline estimates).
Figure V
Categories of Legislated Tax Changes
Panel A: External and Long-Run Reforms
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Notes: This figure shows the timeline of exogenous tax changes in the period 1986q1-2015q4, classified by motivation (i.e. a decompo-
sition of Figure III). Panel A includes measures adopted as a requirement by external bodies, such as the European institutions, and
tax changes aimed at increasing long-run GDP growth. Panel B includes measures whose main aim was to improve the budget balance.
Figure VI shows the results. We find that both categories of tax changes render similar impulse-
response functions, which to some extent resemble that of the baseline. Specifically, a tax increase
imposed by external institutions or motivated by long-run growth generates a fall in output of
1.1% after one year, whereas measures adopted to manage the public balance imply a GDP fall
of 1.6% after 3 quarters and 1.3% after one year, with confidence bands that well encompass the
former estimates. It is worth noting also that GDP recovers much faster when tax changes are
adopted as a result of movements of the budget balance. In this regard, this result is consistent
with Romer and Romer (2010), who find zero effects of deficit-driven tax rises.
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Figure VI
Impact of Different Categories of Exogenous Tax Changes on GDP
Panel A: External and Long-Run Reforms
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Notes: This figure shows the impulse-response functions of an increase of 1% of GDP in taxes on output. Panel A considers tax changes
motivated by external bodies and those aimed at increasing GDP in the long-run. Panel B includes only exogenous deficit consolidation
measures. The model is a three-variable VAR of GDP, government spending, and the short-term interest rate, with both tax series
added as exogenous variables. 68 and 90% error bands are depicted in gray areas.
3.3 Effects of Direct vs. Indirect Taxes
In this subsection we analyze to what extent direct and/or indirect taxation drive the (negative)
effects of taxes on GDP we have found thus far. We define changes in direct taxes as those
pertaining to the personal and corporate income taxes as well as social contributions, whereas
changes in indirect taxes include the value added tax and duties on specific products.10 Of the 45
exogenous tax changes in our dataset, 22 correspond to direct taxes and 19 to indirect taxes. In
terms of the quarterly tax series, out of 30 quarters with tax changes, 18 include changes in direct
taxation and 17 in indirect taxation. Regarding the motivation of the tax changes, direct tax
changes are more likely to be motivated by external factors and long-run reforms, whereas indirect
tax shocks are roughly evenly distributed between external and long-run reforms and deficit-driven
tax changes, see Table III.
We split our tax series into changes in direct and indirect taxation, and include both variables
in the VAR specification in order to take into account that they are likely to be correlated. We find
that the estimated effect of an increase in direct taxes has a lower effect on output than an increase
of indirect taxes, which has a large negative effect on GDP, see Figure VII. As before, we rise a flag
of caution on interpreting these results at face value, given the small sample of measures on which
these estimations are performed. Moreover, we found some evidence that macro developments
help predict changes in indirect taxation. Having said this, it is worth stressing that they point
towards more costly increases of indirect taxes.
10We exclude from this categorization 4 tax changes, corresponding to accounting rules, taxes on non-residents
and taxes on insurance premia.
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Table III
Distribution of the Motivation of
Changes in Direct and Indirect Taxes
External and Long-Run Reforms Defict-driven Changes
Direct Taxes 15 7
Indirect Taxes 10 9
Notes: This table shows the distribution of changes in direct and indirect taxes
regarding their motivation: (i) tax changes imposed by external bodies and those
aiming at increasing long-run GDP, and (ii) tax changes motivated by improving
the government budget. Direct taxes include the personal income tax, the cor-
porate income tax, and social contributions. Indirect taxes comprise the value
added tax and taxes on specific products.
Figure VII
Impact of Changes in Direct vs. Indirect Taxes
Panel A: Direct Taxes
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Notes: This figure shows the impulse-response functions of an increase of 1% of GDP in direct taxes (panel A) and indirect taxes (panel
B) on output. The model is a three-variable VAR of GDP, government spending, and the short-term interest rate, with both tax series
added as exogenous variables. 68 and 90% error bands are depicted in gray areas.
4 Further Results
In this section we present further results on the effect of tax policy changes. Specifically, we explore
the sensitivity of the baseline estimates to including some (exogenous) measures adopted during
the financial crisis and to accounting for anticipation effects. Moreover, we explore the effect of
tax shocks on consumption and investment.
4.1 Including some Tax Changes Adopted during the Financial Crisis
In our baseline estimates we excluded those tax changes adopted during the period 2008-2013,
on the grounds that excluding them helped the unpredictability of the tax series, see Section 2.4.
Nevertheless, the period of financial turmoil that followed the Great Recession provide a useful
source of identifying variation and, at least conceptually, some of the tax reforms implemented a
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this time can be regarded as exogenous, see Section 2.3. In this section we explore the sensitivity
of the baseline estimates to including such measures.
In order to do so, we repeat the baseline VAR model with the new tax series. Moreover,
we add a financial crisis dummy (2008-2013) in order to capture the macroeconomic turbulence
surrounding this period, see Mertens (2015).
Figure VIII shows that this has a small effect on the point estimates of the impulse-response
function. We find that, following a tax increase, GDP falls by 1.2% after one year, which is 0.1
percentage points less than in the baseline. The time profile mimic also that of the benchmark
results. Therefore, we conclude that the estimated negative multipliers we found in the benchmark
case are robust to including the turbulent events surrounding the financial crisis.
Figure VIII
Impulse-Response Functions Including Tax Changes
Adopted in 2008-2013
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Notes: This figure shows the impulse-response functions
of an increase of 1% of GDP on output. The tax series
comprises the whole set of exogenous tax changes, includ-
ing those adopted during the financial crisis (2008-2013).
The model is a three-variable VAR of GDP, government
spending, and the short-term interest rate, with the tax
series added as an exogenous variable. 68 and 90% error
bands are depicted in gray areas.
4.2 Excluding Anticipated Shocks
By estimating the impact of tax shocks at the implementation date rather than at the announce-
ment date, we assumed that agents do not react to anticipated tax shocks. This is in line with the
baseline specifications of Romer and Romer (2010) and Cloyne (2013), who also show a very lim-
ited role of anticipation effects. On the contrary, Mertens and Ravn (2012) find that unanticipated
tax cuts, defined as measures implemented within 90 days of becoming law, give rise to significant
increases in output, consumption and investment, whereas anticipated tax cuts are associated to
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preimplementation drops in output and investment, and no changes in consumption. Once they
are implemented, anticipated tax cuts are associated to increases in output and investment.
In this section we check the sensitivity of our results to anticipation effects by excluding from
the exogenous tax series those shocks that were most likely to be anticipated by agents. Figure IX
shows the distribution of the number of months elapsed between the announcement of each measure
and its implementation, i.e. the implementation lag. We assign the date of the announcement
either to the month the tax change became law or when it was publicly announced provided
that the uncertainty regarding its implementation was low. We can see that the majority of tax
changes are implemented one month after the announcement. Also, many tax changes have an
implementation lag of three months. Note that we include here those measures introduced in the
project of the budget law, usually presented on 30 September, and taking effect on January 1st.
Figure IX
Distribution of the Implementation Lag
Exogenous Tax Changes
0
5
10
15
N
um
be
r o
f T
ax
 C
ha
ng
es
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Implementation Lag (Months)
Notes: This figure shows the distribution of the number
of months elapsed between the announcement of each tax
change and its implementation, i.e. the implementation
lag. The date of announcement is assigned either to the
month the tax change becomes law or when it is publicly
announced if the uncertainty regarding their implementa-
tion is low.
We therefore repeat the VAR specification but excluding those changes with an implementation
lag higher than 3 months. This is consistent with Mertens and Ravn (2012), whose criteria is an
implementation lag lower than 90 days. This proceeding leads to excluding 11 tax changes, hence
reducing the source of variation to 33 tax shocks. Figure X shows that after an unanticipated tax
increase of 1% of GDP, output falls by 1% in the short-term, afterward recovering only slightly
and eventually yielding a permanent GDP loss of 0.8%. One must note that there is considerable
uncertainty regarding these estimates, with wide confidence bands that encompass well the zero
effect after 2 quarters, hence we exert caution in reading these results.
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Figure X
Impact of an Exogenous Tax Increase on GDP
Excluding Anticipated Shocks
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Notes: This figure shows the impulse-response functions
of an unanticipated tax increase of 1% of GDP on out-
put. The model is a three-variable VAR of GDP, gov-
ernment spending, and the short-term interest rate, with
the tax series added as an exogenous variable. The tax
series excludes anticipated tax changes, defined as those
whose implementation lag (the number of months elapsed
from announcement to implementation) is higher than 3
months, as well as those measures adopted during the fi-
nancial crisis (2008-2013). 68 and 90% error bands are
depicted in gray areas.
We carried out two additional exercises with regard to anticipation effects. First, some of the
tax measures were explicitly legislated to be temporary. These measures, opposite to permanent
changes in tax liabilities, would trigger a milder reaction if agents follow the permanent income
hypothesis. We therefore re estimated our baseline VAR excluding these temporary measures,
which implies the suppression of 7 exogenous tax changes. The estimated effect is slightly lower
than the baseline. After an increase of taxes, output falls by 1.0% after 4 quarters, which is 0.2
percentage points less than in the baseline, gradually converging toward zero from that quarter
on. Nevertheless, inspecting the confidence bands of these and the baseline estimates, we conclude
that these differences are not statistically significant.
Second, we analyze the output effects of tax changes at announcement date, rather than at
implementation date. Specifically, we compute the cumulative yearly revenue effect of each tax
change and assign it to the date of announcement.11 We then estimate the effect on output of this
new tax series. We find lower effects with respect to the baseline estimates. GDP falls by 0.5%
in the first 2 quarters and rapidly converges towards zero and even positive estimates, with the
11Note that this procedure implies the exclusion of temporary measures, whose cumulative effect is zero. Note
also that we assign to the next quarter those measures announced in the last month of a quarter.
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one-standard error confidence bands encompassing the zero-effect at all horizons. Therefore, this
exercise suggests that the output effects of tax changes are stronger when they are implemented
compared to when they are announced. Hence, anticipation effects may not be crucial when
accounting for the effect of Spanish tax changes, at least to a first approximation. It must be
noted though that the announcement date is subject to measurement error, as agents can well
anticipate tax changes before legislation is passed. Therefore, one must be cautious in interpreting
this result.
4.3 Effects of Tax Changes on Consumption and Investment
In this section we analyze the effects of tax shocks on private consumption and investment by
adding these two variables to the baseline VAR described in equation (1).12 We find that following
a tax increase, both consumption and investment fall in the short-term, then they recover to
their original levels at larger horizons. After one year, consumption decreases by 0.9% after one
year, whereas the fall in investment is much sharper, 4% after 1 quarter and 3.5% after one year.
Again, there is considerable uncertainty surrounding these estimates but, overall, they suggest
that following a tax increase, investment reacts more than consumption, a result that goes in line
with a similar finding by Cloyne (2013) from the UK.
Figure XI
Impact of an Exogenous Tax Increase on GDP
on Private Consumption and Investment
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Notes: This figure shows the effect of an increase of 1% of GDP on private consumption (panel A) and investment (panel B). The model
is a five-variable VAR of GDP, consumption, investment, government spending, and the short-term interest rate, with the narrative tax
series added as exogenous variables. 68 and 90% error bands are depicted in gray areas.
12In this case, the information criteria suggests a lag order of 2.
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5 Conclusions
This paper makes two contributions. First, it presents a newly constructed narrative dataset of
legislated tax changes adopted in Spain during the period 1986-2015. Second, we use the tax
measures whose motivation is not to offset macro shocks in order to estimate the GDP impact of
tax changes. In this regard, this paper can be framed in an emerging literature that applies the
narrative approach to assess the impact of tax changes on output. This literature was started by
Romer and Romer (2010) and went on with further applications for the US and a few European
countries. The use of narrative methods provide a credible source of identification by overcoming
the traditional problem of finding a source of exogenous variation in tax policies.
Overall, our estimates point towards negative effects from tax increases in Spain. Our baseline
result shows that following a 1% of GDP increase in taxes, output falls by 1.3% after one year,
the negative effects fading away over time. Focusing on changes in indirect taxes and on invest-
ment yield higher falls in output. We also note that the estimates are subject to non-negligible
uncertainty, as confidence bands are wide.
The narrative literature applied to tax policy has experienced significant developments dur-
ing the last years. For example, important contributions have been made on regime-dependent
multipliers (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012)) and on reconciliating the results obtained from
narrative vs. SVAR approaches, see for example Favero and Giavazzi (2012) and Mertens and
Ravn (2013). We think that further research can bring the new narrative dataset of Spain to this
frameworks in order to improve the estimation of the impact of tax shocks. Given the protracted
euro area public debt crisis and the lingering fiscal consolidation needs in several countries, un-
derstanding the effects of fiscal policy on macroeconomic developments remains a crucial issue in
order to promote growth and achieve fiscal sustainability.
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Appendix to:
The Output Effects of Tax Changes:
Narrative Evidence from Spain
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A Overview of Legislated Tax Changes in Spain
In this section, we provide a brief overview of the tax changes recorded in our narrative dataset.
We put special emphasis on the motivation behind the measures, as well as the macroeconomic
conditions under which they were adopted. Macro figures correspond to initial estimates, taken
from the Monthly Bulletin of Banco de Espan˜a and other sources. See Figure I in the main text
for a timeline of the recorded tax changes in the period 1986-2015.
1986
The first measure recorded in our dataset is the introduction of the value added tax (VAT) in
1986q1. It replaced a large and complex set of taxes (for example, a tax on firm operations in force
since 1964), hence it simplified enormously the system of indirect taxes in Spain. The introduction
of the value added tax was a requirement to join the European Economic Community, which
provided rules to harmonize the indirect taxation system across member states. The accession
took place in 1986.
1990-1991
No significant changes in the tax code were implemented until 1990. In 1990-1991 there were some
small changes in the personal income tax stemming from the automatic extension of the 1989
budget law (due to the the early general elections of October 1989, which prevented the budget of
1990 to be approved), and the adjustment of income tranches and withholdings. There were also
two increases in duties on fuels, one in 1990q3, aimed at compensating the loss in revenue from
the liberalization of the oil industry, and another in 1991q1. Overall, taxes increased by 0.2% of
GDP in 1990 and decreased by 0.1% in 1991.
1992
In 1992 there were significant tax reforms. In June 1991 the government passed a reform on
the personal income tax, to be implemented in 1992. It was motivated by a sentence of the
Constitutional Court, who deemed unconstitutional some articles of the original law of 1979 and
1985. The reform had a negative (ex-ante) impact on revenue of around 0.2% of GDP in 1992
and 0.5% in 1993. The government also passed two increases in the value added tax, one in the
budget law of 1992 and another in 1992q3. These two increases were adopted in the context of the
Treaty on European Union (TEU) or Maastricht Treaty, drafted in December 1991 and approved
in February 1992. The treaty established convergence criteria to be fulfilled by 1996 in order to
integrate in the third and last phase of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), to start between
1997 and 1999, leading to the creation of the single currency. These convergence criteria comprised
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inflation, public debt, public deficit, exchange rates and interest rates. Therefore, the budget law
of 1992 was drafted to help achieve these convergence criteria, and, given a slippage of public
deficit in the first semester of 1992, the government approved an additional increase of the value
added tax in July 1992. Although at the time of the TEU GDP was decelerating (annual growth
was around 2.5%), the main motivation behind the value added tax increase of 1992q3 was to
bring down the public deficit, as stated in the motivation of the law. In fact, the convergence plan
presented by Spain in 1992 projected GDP growth to be 3.5% in 1992-1996, above the European
average of 2.5%. The budget law of 1992 introduced two additional tax increases: on fuels and on
social contributions paid on behalf of the unemployed. Overall, the 1992 measures increased tax
liabilities by 0.6% of GDP.
1993
In 1993q1 there were several tax changes. First, as a consequence of the process of harmonization
of the European indirect tax codes, the government reduced the value added tax and, at the same
time, created a new tax on transports. It also kept unchanged the real rates on fuels, leading to
a decrease in revenue in a context of high inflation (6.5%). The government also increased social
contributions in the budget law of 1993. Finally, the personal income tax reform of 1991 had an
effect in 1993q1. These measures were implemented in a context of falling activity, both in Spain
and in Europe. GDP growth in Spain averaged 4.5% in 1988-1990, 1% in 1991-1993, and GDP fell
by 1% in 1993. However, they were not taken with an explicit counter cyclical motive. Rather,
they responded to European directives, past reforms, and the needs of the Social Security. Policy
makers used mainly the monetary policy to foster activity (successive currency devaluations and
reductions in interest rates). The government adopted an additional fiscal measure in 1993q3: an
increase in duties on fuels, due to a perceived deterioration of revenues.
1994-1995
In 1994-1995, as Spain emerged from the recession, four tax measures were taken, all introduced
in the corresponding budget laws. These four measures annihilated each other, hence their impact
on revenues was very low. The budget of 1994 kept unchanged the rate on fuels, leading to a loss
in revenue, and it introduced a new levy on unemployment benefits. In 1995, Spain underwent a
process of fiscal devaluation. The value added tax increased and social contributions were decreased
by the same amount, therefore the ex-ante effect on the budget was neutral.
1996-1998
Between 1996 and 1998 several tax measures were adopted, increasing revenue by 1% overall.
The main goal was to modernize the tax system and to adapt it to the European standards. In
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December 1995 the corporate income tax was reformed, with the aim of improving the computation
of the tax base, adapting it to the 1991 personal income tax reform, and dealing better with an
increasing influx of capital. Moreover, the new government elected in 1996 increased corporate
tax payments on account in the budget law of 1997. Both measures increased revenue by 0.8% of
GDP. Also, the new government approved in June 1996 an update on the book value of assets held
by firms, leading to a small increase in revenue in 1997. It also created a new tax on insurance
premia in September, in order to fulfill European requirements. This tax had a first impact in
1997q1, and was increased one year later. In 1998, the cabinet introduced a new tax on electricity
in order to finance some funding for the mining industry.
1999
In December 1998 the government passed an important overhaul of the personal income tax,
following an experts’ commission who had been gathered in February 1997. The reform affected
both residents and non-residents, and was adopted in the context of the accession to the third
phase of the EMU, starting in January 1999, that would lead to the implementation of the common
monetary policy and the introduction of the euro. The most important feature was the introduction
of an exempt minimum income, with an overall decrease in revenues of 0.6% of GDP.
2000-2002
In 2000-2001 the government implicitly adopted small tax decreases, stemming from the failure
to update the rates on fuels, which were applied on real quantities in the context of inflation
rates above 3%. In 2002 the government passed four measures. First, it created a new duty on
fuels, compensating the revenue losses of the previous two years. This new duty was transferred
to the regions, and had the aim of financing health expenditure, after the completion in 2001
of the process of decentralization of the health system. Later on in 2014 the Court of Justice
of the European Union would invalidate this new duty, and would order the reimbursement of
collections. Second, it reduced social contributions of workers above 60 years old, following a
social agreement in April 2001, motivated by the need to extend the working career of individuals.
Third, it reduced corporate income taxes. This reform was introduced in the same bill as the new
duty on fuels, partly with a counter-cyclical motivation. The bill stated that this tax change was
aimed at fostering growth and employment, in order to counter a slowing-down of the economy.
Indeed year-on-year GDP growth was mildly decelerating, from 4.1% in 2000 (the same rate as
in 1999), to 3.2%, 2.9%, and 2.6% in 2001q1, 2001q2, and 2001q3, respectively. Moreover, this
deceleration of activity prompted the government to approve a labor market reform in May 2002,
which increased flexibility in the labor market and reduced unemployment benefits. However, it
was revoked in October 2002 after a general strike the following month it was passed.
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2003-2004
In 2003 the cabinet approved a second major reform of the personal income tax, following the one
of 1998. The goal of the reform was to increase long-run growth and adapt the tax code to the
introduction of the physical euro in January 2002. The reform consisted mainly on a reduction
of marginal tax rates and tranches, an increase in the exempt minimum income, a widening of
some deductions, and a modification of withholdings. The macroeconomic conditions at the time
were benevolent. GDP growth, at around 2%, was below the average of previous years, but the
perception was that it was behaving comparatively well among an uncertain environment. For
instance, euro area growth in 2002 was expected to be below 1%. The reform of the personal
income tax had differential effects in 2003 and 2004, and also had a mild impact on the corporate
income tax, due to the linkages between both taxes. On the Social Security, the government
adopted a small increase in social contributions of the self-employed in 2004q1. Overall, the
changes on direct taxation negatively impacted revenues by 0.3% of GDP in both 2003 and 2004.
2005-2006
The new government elected in March 2004 approved small changes in indirect taxation in 2005
and 2006. In 2005 it adopted two measures on the value added tax. First, it modified the tax
code on deductions, due to a sentence of the Court of Justice of the European Union. And second,
it approved a front-loading of value added tax rebates. In 2006, for public health reasons, the
government raised the duties on tobacco, in order to induce a price increase.
2007
The main reform during the first term of the government elected in 2004 was a significant overhaul
of direct taxation, implemented in 2007. It affected both personal and corporate income taxes,
and it was passed in a single bill in November 2006. On the personal income tax, the reform
reduced tranches and tax rates, and increased the savings tax rate. On corporate taxation, it
reduced gradually marginal tax rates in 2006 and 2007. The motivation of the reform, as stated
by the bill, was to increase equity, achieve sustainable growth, homogenize the tax rate on savings,
and improve the competitiveness of Spanish firms. The economic conjuncture was benign. GDP
growth was close to 4% and the unemployment rate reached a floor at 8.3% in September 2006.
Also in November 2006 the cabinet passed a bill aimed at preventing fiscal fraud. The law created
a new regime on value added tax for holdings, and was implemented in 2008q1. In November 2007
the government introduced an income tax deduction on births and adoptions, in order to tackle
population aging and provide support for families. Overall, tax liabilities were decreased by 0.5%
of GDP in 2007.
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2008-2009
In the second half of 2007 there started to appear the first signs of a change in the business cycle.
Year-on-year GDP growth in the second half of 2007 averaged around 3.6%, slightly less than
the 4% growth in the first half of the year. The economic situation deteriorated during the first
months of 2008, amid a slowdown of activity in the United States, turbulences in financial markets,
rising commodity prices and difficulties in the construction sector. Activity decelerated to 0.3% in
2008q1 with respect to the previous quarter, versus the growth of 0.8% posted in the last quarter
of 2007. In the budget law of 2008, the government introduced small tax decreases in the personal
income tax and the value added tax. However, it did not adopt counter cyclical measures until
April 2008, when it approved a fiscal stimulus package of around 1% of GDP. It consisted mainly
on four changes, having an effect in 2008 and 2009. First, a tax rebate of e400 for labor income
earners. Second, a modification of corporate income taxes to increase the liquidity of firms. Third,
the repeal of a tax on wealth. And fourth, a front loading of value added tax rebates also in order to
improve firms’ liquidity. Additional to this stimulus package, in March 2009 the cabinet approved
a temporary reduction in employers’ social security contributions in order to support employment.
This measure responded to a sharp worsening of the labor market. Indeed, the unemployment
rate had reached 14.8% in January 2009, up from 9.0% one year earlier. Apart from the stimulus
package, several tax measures approved in previous years had an impact in this period, namely
the reform on direct taxation and the bill preventing fiscal fraud. Overall, in 2008 and in the first
quarter of 2009 taxes decreased by around 2.1% of GDP. In the remaining quarters of 2009, taxes
increased by close to 0.4% of GDP. This was the result of the temporary nature of some of the
measures to improve the liquidity of firms, and of an increase in excise duties (tobacco and fuels),
justified by health and environmental reasons.
2010
2010 was a year of overall tax increases, due to the expiration of some of the stimulus measures
adopted in 2008, and two tax increases passed in the budget law as a consequence of growing
concerns on the public deficit. Indeed, since March 2009 there were some signs of stabilization
in global financial markets and in the pace of falling activity in Spain, which prompted a slight
upward revision of expectations towards the last quarter of 2009. For example, in Autumn 2009
the European Commission revised up its forecast of Spanish GDP growth to -0.8% in 2010, from
the -1% projected in Spring. It also projected positive GDP growth of 1% in 2012. However, the
notorious deterioration of the public finances was a matter of increasing distress. For instance,
in October 2009 the Monthly Bulletin of Banco de Espan˜a projected public deficit to be around
10% of GDP at year-end (vs. 3.8% in 2008), due to the stimulus packages of the previous years,
the recession and the lower tax receipts from the construction industry. This worsening of the
budget balance prompted the government to change the course of fiscal policy. In the draft budget
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of 2010 it adopted two austerity measures: the suppression of the tax rebate of e400 for labor
income earners, and an increase in the VAT to be implemented in July 2010. These, added to the
reversion of some of the stimulus measures implemented in 2008-2009 (on favoring the liquidity
of firms and supporting the labor market) led to an overall tax increase of 1.3% of GDP in 2010.
The further deterioration of the public deficit, a sharp increase in the risk premium, and pressures
stemming from euro area partners, led the government to adopt further measures in May 2010,
namely a decrease in public wages, a pension freeze, and the suppression of the deduction on births
and adoptions approved in 2007. As a result of the 2010 measures, taxes increased a further 0.3%
of GDP in early 2011.
2011
Economic activity in the first half of 2011 showed signs of recovery, although at a slow pace.
Quarter-on-quarter GDP growth in 2010q4 and 2011q1 was 0.2% and 0.3%, respectively. Global
activity was also recovering, although several uncertainties remained. In the euro area, despite
a gradual stabilization of global financial markets, several countries were under financial distress,
especially Greece, Ireland and Portugal. Business conditions deteriorated significantly in July,
when the financial turmoil extended to Italy and Spain. Indeed, the Spanish risk premium jumped
to close to 400 basis points in July, amid concerns on the budget balance and the public debt.
The worsening of the financial crisis prompted the European governments to improve the fiscal
framework of the euro area in leading with the sovereign debt crisis, as well as to approve a new
program for Greece. Later on, in August, the European Central Bank (ECB) started to buy
Italian and Spanish bonds, in order to to prop up prices. In this context, the Spanish government
approved a fiscal package in August, after increasing pressure from the ECB. On the revenue
side, two measures were adopted: a front loading of corporate tax payments of large firms, and a
temporary reduction in taxes associated to home purchases in order to sustain the construction
sector. On the expenditure side, it approved a reduction on pharmaceutical spending. Moreover,
before the general elections due in November, the government approved the restoration of a tax
on wealth, repealed in 2008, in order to raise revenue. On the institutional side, the main political
parties agreed in early September to introduce the principle of budget stability in the Constitution.
Overall, tax changes in 2011 amounted to 0.4% of GDP.
2012
Just a few days after a new government had taken office, in mid December 2011, the cabinet
approved a set of fiscal measures in order to correct the expected deviation of the budget balance
from the targets set by the European Union, of around 2 percentage points of GDP (the first
estimate, released in February 2012, yielded a public deficit of 8.5% of GDP in 2011 vs. a target
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of 6%). The most important tax change was an increase of the personal income tax. Later on,
when the deviation materialized in March 2012, the cabinet introduced further measures on the
corporate income tax, namely the suppression of deductions and an increase in taxes. Overall, the
size of these two packages was approximately 0.75% of GDP in the first half of 2012. Starting in
May, financial tensions increased substantially due to the growing concerns on the health of the
financial sector and on the budget balance, amid the backdrop of the euro area sovereign debt crisis.
In July, the Spanish risk premium soared to above 600 basis points, yields on 10-year government
bonds were at around 7%, and the stock market had fallen by around 20% since the beginning of
the year. On 9 June, the Eurogroup agreed to give a special loan to the government in order to
recapitalize the financial sector, of up to e100 billion. On 10 July, the ECOFIN extended one year
(to 2014) the deadline to bring the public deficit below 3%, setting a new target of 6.3% in 2012.
The need to reduce the public deficit led the government to pass a new fiscal austerity package
in July. On the tax side, it increased the value added tax, to be effective in September. It also
increased the corporate income tax for large firms, reduced tax credits from previous exercises, and
increased the tax base. On the personal income tax, it approved an increase in withholdings and
the suppression of the deduction on house purchases from 2013 onwards. Overall, tax liabilities
increased by 1.1% of GDP in the second half of 2012. These tax increases were complemented by
some reductions in public expenditure, among other a decrease in public wages and a reduction in
unemployment benefits.
2013-2014
In 2013 there was a further net increase of taxes of around 0.2% of GDP, although no significant
measures were adopted, and the fiscal stance stopped being restrictive. The small tax increases
stemmed from two sources. First, three measures adopted at the end of 2012: an increase in
social contributions for high-income earners, a reduction in deductions in the corporate income
tax, and a small increase in the tax base of corporate taxes. An second, the impact of measures
adopted in the previous years, among others, the restoration of a tax on wealth, the suppression of
the deduction on home purchases, and increases in corporate income taxes. The macroeconomic
situation in 2013 improved slightly, with significant decreases in the risk premium and reductions
in the volatility of financial markets. Real GDP kept contracting during the first half of the year,
although at a slower pace: quarter-on-quarter GDP growth amounted to -0.4% in 2013q1 and
-0.1% in 2013q2, vs -0.8% in 2012q4. Later on, it would gradually gain speed, posting +0.1% in
2013q3 and 0.2% in 2013q4. In 2014 there were additional small fiscal measures. The government
approved at the end of 2013 a further increase in social contributions of high-income earners, and
an increase in the tax base of social contributions by including payments in kind and by modifying
payroll taxes of the self-employed. The macroeconomic conditions in 2014 improved further, with
GDP growing at around 0.5% quarter-on-quarter during the year and employment increasing at
close to 2% at year-end.
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2015
In the context of the economic recovery and ahead of an electoral year, the government approved
in late 2014 an important tax decrease in both the personal and the corporate income tax, to
be implemented in 2015 and 2016, consisting mainly on a reduction on marginal tax rates and a
modification of tax bases and deductions. Later on, in July 2015 the government brought forward
the part of the reform initially set to be implemented in 2016. This decision was taken under solid
growth rates (year-on-year growth approached 3% in the first half of the year) and in the context
of forthcoming general elections, which would take place in December. Overall, taxes decreased
by 0.9% of GDP in 2015.
B List of Legislated Tax Changes
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Table A.I
List of Legislated Tax Changes
Type Announcement First Impact Description (in Spanish) Exog. Cumulative Impact Perm/Temp Source
VAT 02-Aug-85 1986q1 Introduccio´n del IVA (tipos 6%, 12% y 33%) en susti-
tucio´n del ITE, CGI y del impuesto sobre el lujo
External 0.30 Permanent Ley 30/1985.
PIT 29-Dec-89 1990q1 Deflactacio´n tarifa y retenciones Consolidation -0.16 Permanent RDL 7/1989.
PIT 29-Dec-89 1990q1 Retraso en ajustar retenciones del trabajo a las modi-
ficaciones introducidas por el Real Decreto-ley 7/1989,
de 29 de diciembre.
Consolidation 0.00 Temporary RD 1009/1990.
ED 30-Dec-89 1990q1 No se modifican los tipos, excepto la introduccio´n de
gasolina sin Pb a menor tipo, (frente a una var. IPC
del 6,7%) hidrocarburos
Consolidation -0.08 Permanent RDL 7/1989.
ED 06-Jul-90 1990q3 Incremento de los tipos de gravamen (en torno al 20%)
hidrocarburos
Long-run 0.32 Permanent RDL 3/1990.
ED 30-Sep-90 1991q1 Incremento de los tipos de gravamen (en torno al 14%,
frente a una var. IPC del 5,9%) hidrocarburos
Consolidation 0.12 Permanent Ley 31/1990
PIT 20-Dec-90 1991q1 Retraso en ajustar retenciones del trabajo a las mod-
ificaciones introducidas por el RDL 5/1990, de 20 de
diciembre, de Medidas Fiscales Urgentes.
Consolidation 0.00 Temporary R 717/1991.
PIT 20-Dec-90 1991q1 Deflactacio´n tarifa Consolidation -0.18 Permanent RDL 5/1990.
PIT 06-Jun-91 1992q1 Nueva Ley IRPF, por la sentencia del TC 45/1989
sobre tributacio´n conjunta
External -0.70 Permanent Ley 18/1991.
SIC 30-Sep-91 1992q1 Subida tipo desempleo del 7,40% al 8,40% External 0.09 Permanent Ley 31/1991.
VAT 30-Sep-91 1992q1 Aumento de tipos impositivo: del 12% al 13% y 33%
al 28%
External 0.18 Permanent LEY 31/1991.
ED 30-Sep-91 1992q1 Incremento de los tipos de gravamen (en torno al 15%,
frente a una var. IPC del 5,9%) hidrocarburos
External 0.13 Permanent Ley 31/1991.
VAT 21-Jul-92 1992q3 Aumento del tipo impositivo: del 13% al 15% Consolidation 0.45 Permanent RDL 5/1992.
VAT 21-Jul-92 1993q1 Supresio´n del tipo incrementado (28% al 15%: se crea
el impuesto determinados medios transporte) y es-
tablece un tipo superreducido del 3%
External -0.21 Permanent Ley 37/1992.
SIC 30-Sep-92 1993q1 Subida tipo RG del 28,80% al 29,30% y auto´nomos del
28,64% al 28,80%
Consolidation 0.13 Permanent Ley 39/1992.
ED 28-Dec-92 1993q1 Crea el Impuesto sobre determinados medios de trans-
porte, como respuesta a la supresio´n del tipo incremen-
tado del IVA (28% al 15%), al tipo del 13%
External 0.18 Permanent Ley 38/1992.
ED 30-Dec-92 1993q1 No se modifican los tipos (frente a una var. IPC del
4,6%) hidrocarburos
Consolidation -0.07 Permanent BdE.
ED 04-Aug-93 1993q3 Incremento de los tipos de gravamen (en torno al 9%)
a partir de agosto hidrocarburos
Consolidation 0.14 Permanent RDL 13/1993.
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Table A.I
List of Legislated Tax Changes (Continued)
Type Announcement First Impact Description (in Spanish) Exogeneity Cumulative Impact Perm/Temp Source
PIT 30-Sep-93 1994q1 Sujeta a tributacio´n las prestaciones por desempleo Consolidation 0.08 Permanent Ley 21/1993.
ED 30-Sep-93 1994q1 No se modifican los tipos, excepto fue´loleos (frente a
una var. IPC del 4,7%) hidrocarburos
Consolidation -0.08 Permanent BdE. Ley 21/1993.
VAT 30-Sep-94 1995q1 Se elevan en un punto todos los tipos impositivos: 4%
[3%], 7% [6%] y 16% [15%]
Long-run 0.23 Permanent Ley 41/1994.
SIC 30-Sep-94 1995q1 Rebaja tipo RG del 29,30% al 28,30%, auto´nomos del
28,80% al 28,30%. Se compensa con subida IVA
Long-run -0.26 Permanent Ley 41/1994.
O 30-Sep-96 1997q1 Instauracio´n del impuesto sobre primas de seguro External 0.07 Permanent Ley 13/1996.
CIT 27-Dec-95 1997q2 Nueva Ley IS ma´s elevacio´n porcentajes de pagos a
cuenta al 18% [15%] o´ 25% [20%], segu´n que se tome
como base la cuota del per´ıodo anterior o la del ejer-
cicio en curso
Long-run 0.75 Permanent Ley 43/1995.. Ley 12/1996.
O 07-Jun-96 1997q3 Actualizacio´n balances Long-run 0.00 Temporary RDL 7/1996.
O 30-Sep-97 1998q1 Elevacio´n del tipo del impuesto al 6% [4%] sobre pri-
mas de seguro
Consolidation 0.06 Permanent Ley 65/1997.
ED 30-Dec-97 1998q1 Crea un impuesto (vinculado a la asuncio´n por el Es-
tado de un nuevo gasto enrelacio´n con el apoyo a la
miner´ıa del carbo´n) sobre le electricidad
Endogeneous 0.10 Permanent Ley 66/1997.
PIT 08-Dec-98 1999q1 Reforma del IRPF aproximando la base imponible a
la renta disponible mediante la introduccio´n en la base
del mı´nimo vital
Long-run -0.79 Permanent LEY 40/1998.
O 09-Dec-98 1999q1 Instauracio´n independiente de la tributacio´n de no res-
identes
Long-run 0.16 Permanent Ley 41/1998.
ED 30-Dec-99 2000q1 No se modifican los tipos (frente a una var. IPC del
3,4%) hidrocarburos
Consolidation -0.05 Permanent BdE.
ED 30-Dec-00 2001q1 No se modifican los tipos (frente a una var. IPC del
3,6%) hidrocarburos
Consolidation -0.05 Permanent BdE.
SIC 27-Dec-01 2002q1 Reduccio´n de cotizaciones para trabajadores mayores
de 60 y de 65 aos y contratacio´n de mujeres hasta 24
meses despue´s de dar a luz
Long-run -0.22 Permanent RDL 16/2001.Ley 35/2002.
CIT 24-Dec-01 2002q2 Rebaja al 18% [35%] la tributacio´n de las plusval´ıas
empresariales acumuladas que se reinviertan en un
per´ıodo de 4 aos
Endogeneous -0.23 Permanent Ley 24/2001.
ED 27-Dec-01 2002q2 Implantacio´n del Impuesto sobre ventas minoristas
(ce´ntimo sanitario, que se integra en Especial Hidro-
carburos en 2013, libro amarillo PGE2013 -pa´g. 38- y
se devuelve como TrfCapPagos en 2014) hidrocarburos
Endogeneous 0.14 Permanent Ley 24/2001.
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Type Announcement First Impact Description (in Spanish) Exogeneity Cumulative Impact Perm/Temp Source
PIT 28-Jun-02 2003q1 Obligatoriedad del ingreso mensual de retenciones del
trabajo para AAPP con presupuesto ¿ 6 mill.
Long-run 0.00 Temporary RD 594/2002.
PIT 18-Dec-02 2003q1 Reduce tramos (a 5 [6]) y tipos (ma´x. 45% [48%] y
mı´n. 15% [18%]), aumenta los mı´nimos vitales, nuevas
deducciones para ¿75 aos y transparencia fiscal
Long-run -0.51 Permanent LEY 46/2002.
SIC 30-Sep-03 2004q1 Subida tipo auto´nomos del 28,30% al 29,80% Long-run 0.05 Permanent LEY 61/2003.
CIT 18-Dec-02 2004q2 Traspaso del IRPF por transparencia fiscal Long-run 0.05 Permanent LEY 46/2002.
VAT 06-Oct-05 2005q4 No hay que aplicar la regla de prorrata por el exclu-
sivo hecho de recibir subvenciones de capital, o de ex-
plotacio´n no vinculadas a precios
External 0.00 Temporary Sentencia TJCE, 6 de octubre de 2005.
ED 10-Feb-06 2006q1 Incremento de los tipos (desde 11 febrero) espec´ıfico y
”ad valorem” de gravamen (54,95% al 57,0%) tabaco
Consolidation 0.06 Permanent RDL 2/2006.
VAT 2006q1 Adelanto permanente de devoluciones Long-run 0.00 Temporary AEAT.
PIT 28-Nov-06 2007q1 Reduce tramos (a 4 [5]) y tipos (ma´x. 43% [45%]),
mı´nimos vitales no minoran la base sino van a la tarifa,
se eleva el tipo (al 18%) sobre la renta del ahorro
Long-run -0.33 Permanent Ley 35/2006.
CIT 28-Nov-06 2007q2 Reduce gradualmente el tipo general en dos aos del
35%, al 32,5% y al 30%. El tipo para PYME baja en
un ao al 30% (al 25% para los primeros 120.202,41)
Endogeneous -0.68 Permanent LEY 35/2006.
PIT 15-Nov-07 2007q4 Devoluciones anticipadas (aplicable a nacimientos
desde 01/07/2007, que se suprime en 2011) del Plan
CUNA
Long-run -0.13 Permanent Ley 35/2007.
VAT 29-Nov-06 2008q1 Se crea un nuevo re´gimen especial de declaracio´n para
grupos consolidados
Long-run 0.00 Temporary Ley 36/2006.
PIT 30-Sep-07 2008q1 Deflactacio´n de la tarifa, mı´nimos personales y famil-
iares y rendm. trabajo
Consolidation -0.09 Permanent Ley 51/2007.
PIT 18-Apr-08 2008q2 Implanta una nueva deduccio´n (que se suprime en
2010) de 400 para perceptores de rentas del trabajo
Endogeneous -0.54 Permanent RDL 2/2008.
CIT 21-Apr-08 2008q2 Opcio´n (para GE) de efectuar los pagos fraccionados
del 2008 en funcio´nde la cuota del ao anterior, o tomar
como referencia la parte de base imponible a lo largo
del 2008
Endogeneous 0.00 Temporary RDL 2/2008.
O 23-Dec-08 2009q1 Los tipos del Impuesto quedan en cero Endogeneous -0.21 Permanent Ley 4/2008.
VAT 23-Dec-08 2009q1 Las empresas podra´n optar por recibir mensualmente
la devolucio´n de IVA
Endogeneous 0.00 Temporary Ley 4/2008.
SIC 06-Mar-09 2009q1 Bonificacio´n cuotas empresariales por creacio´n empleo Endogeneous 0.00 Temporary RDL 2/2009.
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CIT 23-Dec-08 2009q3 Libertad de amortizacio´n para adquisiciones en 2009 y
2010 con mantenimiento del empleo. Se extiende (sin
condicio´n de empleo) en diciembre 2011 y se elimina
en 2012
Endogeneous -0.01 Permanent Ley 4/2008. RDL 13/2010. RDL 12/2012.
ED 12-Jun-09 2009q3 Incremento de los tipos (desde 13 junio) hidrocarburos Consolidation 0.09 Permanent RDL 8/2009.
PIT 30-Sep-09 2010q1 Suprime parcialmente la deduccio´n (implantada en
2008) de 400 para perceptores de rentas del trabajo
Endogeneous 0.49 Permanent Ley 26/2009.
VAT 26-Sep-09 2010q3 Incrementos tipos desde 1 julio 2010: 16,0% al 18,0%
y 7,0% al 8,0%
Consolidation 0.63 Permanent Ley 26/2009.
PIT 30-Sep-10 2011q1 Suprime las devoluciones anticipadas (implantado en
2007) del Plan CUNA
Consolidation 0.09 Permanent Ley 39/2010.
CIT 19-Aug-11 2011q4 Desde el 20/08 se eleva el porcentaje de ca´lculo de
los pagos fraccionados (para los aos 2011 a 2013) para
empresas que facturan ma´s de 20 mill. y 60 mill.: se
pasa a permanente
Endogeneous 0.00 Temporary RDL 9/2011.
VAT 19-Aug-11 2011q4 Se rebaja el tipo impositivo del 8% al 4% a las entregas
de viviendas realizadas entre el 20 de agosto y el 31 de
diciembre 2012. Se prorroga al 2013
Endogeneous 0.00 Temporary RDL 9/2011. RDL 20/2011.
O 16-Sep-11 2012q1 Restablece el Impuesto sobre Patrimonio Consolidation 0.12 Permanent RDL 13/2011. Ley 22/2013.
PIT 30-Dec-11 2012q1 En 2012 y 2013 (pasa a permanente) se introduce
gravamen complementario entre 0,75 y 7,00 puntos en
funcio´n del tramo de la base liquidable y la retencio´n
sobre el capital al 21%
Consolidation 0.46 Permanent RDL 20/2011.
CIT 30-Mar-12 2012q2 Limita la deduccio´n de los gastos financieros de
cre´ditos con entidades del grupo. Se extiende en julio
la limitacio´n para todas las sociedades
Consolidation 0.11 Permanent RDL 12/2012. RDL 20/2012.
CIT 30-Mar-12 2012q2 Se establece (2012 y 2013) un pago fraccionado mı´nimo
(8% del resultado contable positivo) para empresas
que facturen ma´s de 20 mill. : pasa a permanente
Consolidation 0.00 Temporary RDL 12/2012. RDL 20/2012.
VAT 13-Apr-12 2012q3 Incrementos tipos desde 1 septiembre 2012: 18,0% al
21,0% y 8,0% al 10,0%
Endogeneous 0.94 Permanent RDL 20/2012.
CIT 13-Jul-12 2012q4 Incrementa los tipos impositivos para las entidades con
facturacio´n mayor a 10, 20 y 60 mill.: pasan del 21%,
24% y 27%, respectivamente, al 23%, 26% y 29%
Endogeneous 0.00 Temporary RDL 20/2012.
PIT 13-Jul-12 2012q4 En 2012 y 2013 se elevan del 15% al 21% las reten-
ciones de actividades profesionales y rend. del trabajo
derivados de la imparticio´n de cursos conferencias, etc
Endogeneous -0.08 Temporary RDL 20/2012.
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Table A.I
List of Legislated Tax Changes (Continued)
Type Announcement First Impact Description (in Spanish) Exogeneity Cumulative Impact Perm/Temp Source
CIT 13-Jul-12 2012q4 En 2012 y 2013 (pasa a permanente) se aumenta la
limitacio´n a la compensacio´n de bases imponibles neg-
ativas y por inmovilizado intangible
Endogeneous 0.00 Temporary RDL 20/2012.
CIT 13-Jul-12 2012q4 En 2012 y 2013 (pasa a permanente) aumenta la base
imponible con el 25% del importe de dividendos y
rentas a los que resulte de aplicacio´n la exencio´n por
doble imposicio´n
Endogeneous 0.00 Temporary RDL 20/2012.
SIC 01-Jul-12 2013q1 Aumento de las bases ma´ximas de cotizacio´n en un
5,0%
Consolidation 0.08 Permanent Ley 17/2012.
O 30-Sep-12 2013q1 Creacio´n impuestos sobre produccio´n energ´ıa ele´ctrica,
combustible nuclerar y almacenamiento rediduos ra-
dioactivos
Consolidation 0.19 Permanent Ley 15/2012.
CIT 27-Dec-12 2013q2 Para 2013 y 2014 (pasa a permanente) se limita al
70% del ma´ximo previsto en tablas la deduccio´n de las
amortizaciones del inmovilizado material para grandes
empresas
Consolidation -0.08 Permanent Ley 16/2012.
SIC 30-Sep-13 2014q1 Aumento de las bases ma´ximas de cotizacio´n en un
5,0%
Consolidation 0.08 Permanent Ley 22/2013.
SIC 20-Dec-13 2014q1 Pagos en especie y auto´nomos Long-run 0.10 Permanent RDL 16/2013.
PIT 23-Jun-14 2015q1 Rebaja los tipos en dos aos (2015 y 2016). Tambie´n
modifica deducciones
Long-run -0.36 Permanent Ley 26/2014.
CIT 23-Jun-14 2015q1 Rabaja tipos del 30% al 28% y 25% en dos aos y ampl´ıa
bases
Long-run -0.11 Permanent Ley 27/2014.
PIT 10-Jul-15 2015q3 Adelanta la segunda parte de la reforma de 2016 a
julio de 2015
Long-run -0.14 Permanent RDL 9/2015.
Notes: This table shows the narrative dataset of legislated tax changes of the period 1986-2015. The type of tax changes are: value added tax (VAT), personal income tax
(PIT), corporate income tax (CIT), social insurance contributions (SIC), excise duties (ED) and other (O). First impact is the quarter where the tax change triggered the
first change in liabilities/payments with respect to the previous year. The announcement date corresponds generally to the date the tax change becomes law. Endogenous
measures are those taken to offset macroeconomic shocks likely to affect output in the near term. The exogenous categories are as follows: long-run are tax changes aimed at
increasing long-run growth; external changes are those imposed external bodies; and consolidation measures are those enacted to improve the budget balance independently of
the macroeconomic situation. Note also that we exclude from the estimation of the baseline impulse-response functions those tax changes adopted during the period 2008-2013,
i.e. those between RDL 2/2008 and RDL 16/2013. The cumulative impact is the yearly cumulative impact in percentage of GDP.
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